This paper establishes a basis in economic theory for solving the problem of how to make comparisons of aggregate quantities and price levels across two or more geographic regions. Two new classes of relative purchasing power measures are set out and the dual relationships between them are explored. The first is a manyhousehold analogue of the (single-household) cost-of-living index and, as such, is rooted in the theory of group cost-of-living indexes. The second is motivated by a generalization of the cost-of-living index and consists of sets of (nominal) expenditure-share deflators. A particular set of these deflators and the associated system of (real) consumption shares are shown to have definite bounds, and the latter is shown to provide rigorous exact index-number interpretations for a trio of axiomatic quantity indexes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C43, C81, F31, O18, O57.
INTRODUCTION
It is by now well known that the relative purchasing power of currencies cannot be approximated using exchange rates. 2 This knowledge is reflected in the widespread practice among organizations concerned with international affairs of publishing real income data calculated using one of the doi:10.1006Âjeth.2000.2767, available online at http:ÂÂwww.idealibrary.com on 585 0022-0531Â01 35.00 two``purchasing power parity'' (PPP) methods that have come to be favoured by most experts in the field of international comparisons. 3 Notwithstanding the fact that either of these methods is an enormous improvement over the exchange-rate approach, all three suffer from the same apparent lack of grounding in economic theory. This is also true of every other multilateral comparison formula developed to date. Nowhere in the relevant literature is there any strong economic justification for the use of one formula over another.
Any price index between two groups of countries is, by definition, a measure of PPP. The most commonly required indexes of this sort involve single-country groups in which commodities are valued using different currencies. Since there is no definite relationship between such a measure and the corresponding exchange rate parity the most readily observable and seemingly appropriate proxy how should suitable PPPs be constructed?
A natural way to begin thinking about PPPs is in terms of the cost-ofliving index. The present paper shows that the interspatial interpretation of this concept can be generalized to facilitate comparisons of real private consumption among groups of countries. It should be understood that, by necessarily limiting the domain of comparison to private consumer goods and services, countries and households instead of the more general final-use commodities, geographic regions and purchasers, this approach cannot offer a complete answer to the question posed above. It is, however, an important first step towards doing so.
Two new classes of PPP measures relevant for international comparisons of income and consumption levels are set out below. The first, developed in Sections 2 and 3, is the many-household analogue of the (singlehousehold) cost-of-living index constructed by taking a mean of order * of the relevant single-household indexes. The resulting aggregate index is shown to have desirable properties in the most unrestricted setting, and additional desirable properties if preferences are assumed to be identical across countries.
Members of the second class of PPP measures are sets of (nominal) expenditure-share deflators, each corresponding to a system of (real) consumption shares for a bloc of countries. Such measures are instrumental to the theoretical economic analysis of the (axiomatic) multilateral comparison formulae alluded to above. Sections 4 and 5 introduce reasonable generalizations of the cost-of-living index and the Allen consumption index as a self-consistent pair within the second class. These indexes are shown to have definite bounds in terms of observable bilateral fixed-weight indexes and to be dual to the mean-of-order-one index of the first class.
Using an exact index-number argument, Section 6 shows that three particular systems of axiomatic quantity indexes are justifiable in terms of specific members of the second class. The practical relevance of this result is that it provides a basis in economic theory for choosing a multilateral comparison formula.
BLOC-SPECIFIC PPP INDEXES
Consider a bloc comprising n 2 countries indexed by the set N := [1, ..., n]. Within this bloc there are m 2 well-defined types of consumer goods and services. Let M :=[1, ..., m] denote the general list of these commodities and let M k M denote the subset that is available in country k # N. Every country-specific commodity list contains at least two items.
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In each country k # N, a representative household is assumed to purchase x kl 0 units of commodity l # M k at a price of p kl >0 country-k currency units (k8, for short). 5 For any good or service l # M"M k that is unavailable in country k, x kl #0 and there is sufficient information to estimate a reservation price p kl >0.
6 Let
denote the representative country-k consumption bundle and let p k := ( p k1 , ..., p km ) # R m ++ denote the vector of country-k commodity prices. The (n_m) matrix of all commodity prices in the bloc and the corresponding matrix of representative quantities are denoted by P :=(p 1 , ..., p n ) and X :=(x 1 , ..., x n ) , respectively.
The preferences of the kth (representative) household over the commodity space indexed by M are assumed to be represented by a (direct) utility function
++ _U k Ä R shows the minimum expenditure required to attain utility level v in U k , the range of u k , at commodity prices p # R m ++ ; i.e.,
Assuming that u k is continuous and increasing (regularity conditions R1), c k is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogeneous (PLH) and concave
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4 Formally, |M k | 2.
5 Representative households are assumed for the sake of expositional clarity. The need for their existence may be expunged by regarding the bloc as a collection of households rather than as a collection of countries. As such, N would index the constituent households, M k would denote a household-specific commodity list, and x kl would be household k's consumption of commodity l. 6 Using a hedonic price index, for example. See Griliches [11, 12] and Kravis and Lipsey [16] .
in p, increasing in v, jointly continuous in (p, v) and positive (regularity conditions R2).
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In the present context, the (Konu s [15] -type) cost-of-living index for household k is the ratio of the minimum expenditure required to attain a particular utility level under the price regimes of any two countries in the bloc:
The number r k (p i , p j , v) is the factor by which household k's nominal expenditure at country-i prices must be deflated in order to make it equal to the same household's nominal expenditure at country-j prices. Thus
is a``country-k-specific'' PPP of the dimensionality i8Âj8 the number of units of country i's currency per unit of country j 's. There are four essential properties of the country-k PPP index that follow directly from its definition and R2: r k is positive (P1), non-decreasing in p i (P2), PLH in p i (P3) and transitive with respect to p i and p j (P4).
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The primary application of a set of PPPs is in extending the usefulness of national accounts data by making economically meaningful cross-country comparisons or combinations of such data feasible. This is achieved by using the PPPs to deflate associated nominal-expenditure ratios. 9 The results of such calculations are needed for policy purposes and for the purposes of empirical economic analysis by international organizations that exist to further the collective interests of a bloc of countries.
For example, policy decisions regarding desirable levels of intra-bloc aid from``have'' to``have-not'' countries require a measure of each country's per-capita consumption level relative to some nume raire. None of the country-specific indexes [r k ] k # N provide an appropriate basis for such a measure. This is due to the fact that, in general, different country-specific indexes yield different sets of PPPs for the members of the same bloc, and there is no good reason to choose one country's representative household over another's to represent the bloc as a whole. What is required, then, is an index that somehow reflects the preferences of all representative 588 KEIR G. ARMSTRONG 7 A proof of this statement can be found in Diewert [5] . 8 With the singular exception of Samuelson and Swamy's [22, pp. 571 572]``dimensional invariance test,'' which asserts that the cost-of-living index is invariant to changes in the dimensionality andÂor ordering of prices, all other properties of r k that appear in the literature are implied by one or more of P1 P4. Dimensional invariance follows from the fact that a change in the dimensionality andÂor ordering of prices imposes no restrictions per se on the functional form of r k .
9 E.g., see Eq. (22) below.
households in the relevant bloc. Under such a requirement, the purchasing power of one national currency relative to another will depend on whether some third country is a member of the same bloc. In other words, it will be``bloc specific.'' One way to construct such an index is by aggregating over the n instances of the country-specific variety. Indexes defined under this approach in the intertemporal context are called group cost-of-living indexes because they measure the impact on a group of households of moving from one price regime to another and are constructed as weighted averages of singlehousehold cost-of-living indexes. The theory of such index-number formulae was developed by Pollak [18, 19] and Diewert [7] .
A natural way to aggregate over the country-k PPP indexes is to choose a real number * and a set of weights
denotes the unit simplex of dimension n&1, and then take a mean of order *,
where the function M *, a :
is a mean of order * and v :=(v 1 , ..., v n ) # U 1 _ } } } _U n is the vector of representative base utility levels. 10 If, for each k # N, a k is chosen to be the fraction of households living in country k, then R *, a is``democratic'' in the sense of assigning weights to the relevant country-specific indexes that are increasing in the number of households that the indexes represent. Alternatively, if a k is chosen to be the bloc expenditure share of the country-k households, then R *, a is``plutocratic'' in the sense of giving more weight to r k s that represent higher spending.
Since M *, a is positive and continuous, and non-decreasing and PLH in its arguments, R *, a satisfies P1 P3. For *{0, R *, a does not in general satisfy P4. It is possible, however, to modify the aggregation rule so that the resulting index is transitive for all * # R. This can be accomplished by making the weights depend in a particular way on *, p j , v and a vector of positive real numbers h :=(h 1 , ..., h n ) .
Proof. See Appendix.
In Eq. (5), since c k (p j , v k ) is a measure of the income of the single household considered to be representative of all households living in country k # N, it makes sense to set h k equal to the number of country-k households and to interpret * as a (negative)``equity weight.'' Thus, the bigger the country, the larger the value of h k and the higher its weight per unit of income (in j8). For *<0, poor countries receive a higher weight per household than rich ones. For *>0, rich countries receive a higher weight per household than poor ones.
Formally, then, a mean-of-order-* PPP index for country i relative to country j is a function R * :
) defined by the right-hand side of (3) with weights given by (5) . As a weighted average of the r k s, R * inherits the dimensionality i8Âj8 and depends on the preferences of all the representative households in the bloc.
11 As a weighted average with carefully chosen weights, R * has the same desirable properties of monotonicity, homogeneity and transitivity as does r k .
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The final result of this section is an axiomatic characterization of the class of mean-of-order-* PPP indexes that is analogous to the axiomatic characterization of the cost-of-living index provided by Diewert [6, Theorem 1] .
, where e k is the n-dimensional unit column vector with e kk =1. Further, for some * # R and for all
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Then, for all k # N, c k is an expenditure function that satisfies R2 and the money-metric utility scaling property
and R is the mean-of-order-* PPP index for country i relative to country j corresponding to the preferences that are dual to [c k ] k # N . Conversely, given expenditure functions c k : R m+1 ++ Ä R that satisfy R2 and (6) and given some * # R,
PLUTOCRATIC AND DEMOCRATIC PPP INDEXES
Prais [21] was the first to note that official group cost-of-living indexes like the Consumer Price Index assign an implicit weight to each constituent household's consumption pattern that is proportional to its total expenditure. He called such indexes``plutocratic'' and suggested an alternative``democratic'' variety that treats all households equally. Pollak [18] formalized these concepts by extending the theory of the (single-household) cost-of-living index to groups. The present section interprets this extended theory in terms of the mean-of-order-* class of bloc-specific PPP indexes defined above and compares the results with those obtained by Diewert [7] in the intertemporal context.
Under the maintained international-comparisons interpretation, Pollak's Scitovsky group cost-of-living index becomes the (Prais Pollak) plutocratic PPP index 13 and is defined as the ratio of the minimum bloc expenditure required to attain per-household utility levels v at country-i prices to that required at country-j prices:
Multiplying and dividing the numerator on the right-hand side of this expression by c k (p j , v k ) reveals that the plutocratic PPP index is an expenditure-share-weighted average of the corresponding country-specific PPP indexes; i.e.,
where : k (p j , v, h, 1) is country-k's share of (possibly hypothetical) bloc expenditure at prices p j and utility levels v. Pollak's democratic group cost-of-living index becomes the additive democratic PPP index 13 and is defined as a household-share-weighted average of the corresponding country-specific PPP indexes
where h k :=h k Â1 n h is the fraction of bloc households living in country k, 1 n being the n-dimensional (column) vector of ones. As shown in Diewert [7] , a second type of democratic index can be constructed by replacing the arithmetic average in (10) by its geometric counterpart. The result of doing so is called the multiplicative democratic PPP index 13 for country i relative to country j :
In both sorts of democratic PPP index, the use of household-share weights has the effect of counting every household equally. In contrast, by implicitly weighting each household-specific PPP index by its total expenditure, the plutocratic variety counts every dollar of consumption spending equally.
Since by (5) : k (p j , v, h, *)=h k when *=0, it is clear from their respective definitions that the multiplicative democratic PPP index is the same as the mean-of-order-zero PPP index:
Similarly, the plutocratic PPP index is the same as the mean-of-order-one PPP index
The additive democratic PPP index, however, is not a member of the mean-of-order-* class of bloc-specific PPP indexes. By Theorem 1 and since : k (p j , v, h, *){h k when *=1, R AD is not transitive with respect to p i and p j . Worse still, it does not even satisfy the weaker property of``country reversal:'' 592
where each of the two inequalities follows by the Theorem of the Arithmetic and Geometric Means 15 and the equality follows by the transitivity and positivity properties of R MD . The existence of an alternative to R AD that is both democratic and transitive eliminates the need to consider this index any further.
The next theorem shows that the translog PPP index (defined below) is exact for the multiplicative democratic PPP index evaluated at a particular vector of base utility levels when preferences are dual to a translog expenditure function. 
:
where
is the country-j translog PPP index, | kl :=p kl x kl Âp k x k is the lth household-k expenditure share and +* ij :=(+ i * + j *) 1Â2 .
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An obvious weakness of this result is its dependence on preferences being identical across households a weakness not shared by the intertemporal analogue as comparison with Diewert [7, Theorem 9] reveals. A similar asymmetry of outcomes is evident in the relative applicability of certain bounds on the plutocratic and additive democratic indexes: The bounding theorems for these indexes in the intertemporal context 17 have no direct counterparts in the international one. All of these asymmetries are due to the fact that in the latter context it is impossible to observe each household's consumption bundle at the prices faced by at least one other household. By contrast, the data available in the former context include (in principle) the consumption bundles of each household at the prices faced by all households during at least two periods of time; i.e., for each period t # T N and for each representative group-k household (k # N), there is a vector x 
THE MULTILATERAL-KONU S PPP INDEX
Section 2 above introduced a new class of bloc-specific PPP indexes constructed by taking a mean of order * of the associated country-specific indexes. The remainder of the paper pursues alternative multilateral approaches to the construction of bloc-specific indexes with the object of providing a theoretical basis for certain systems of axiomatic quantity indexes. In the present section, a reasonable generalization of r k is used to specify a PPP index that relates the general or average price level of each country to that of the bloc as a whole. The same index is derived indirectly in the next section by generalizing a quantity counterpart to r k , and then both types of indexes are shown to be dual to the plutocratic PPP index.
To begin with, let # k # R ++ denote the price of a unit of country k's currency (1 k8) in terms of the currency units of some nume raire country.
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Consequently, the ratio # k Â# i (i8Âk8) is country i's exchange rate with respect to country k. Throughout the rest of the paper, pÄ k :=# k p k denotes the vector of nume raire-country-denominated country-k commodity prices and P :=(pÄ 1 , ..., pÄ n ) denotes the associated matrix. Use of such a normalization allows the summation of household expenditure functions as in the following definition of country i 's share of (possibly hypothetical) bloc expenditure at utility levels v:
Likewise, it facilitates the definition of the bloc expenditure function
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The substitution of C for c k in (2) gives rise to a logical bloc-specific counterpart to the (Konu s-type) country-k PPP index. Specifically, the multilateral-Konu s (MK) PPP index for country i relative to the bloc as a whole is defined as the ratio of the minimum expenditure required to attain utility levels v* :=(v 1 * , ..., v n *) , v k * :=u k (x k ), when every representative household faces the prices of country i to the minimum expenditure required to attain the same utility levels when each household faces the prices of its home country:
The number D MK, i (P , v*, h) may be interpreted as the factor by which cost-minimizing bloc expenditure at country-i prices and actual utility levels must be deflated in order to make it equal to nominal bloc expenditure. Thus the numerator of (19) is the sum of (hypothetical) bloc expenditures when the jth household ( j # N) faces the prices of country i, pÄ i , and its utility level is held constant at the actual value v j *. Use of (16) and (2) with v :=v j * in conjunction with (19) reveals that the MK PPP index is an expenditure-share-weighted sum of country-specific PPP indexes; i.e.,
Following directly from this fact is a corollary to Pollak's [17, p. 11] wellknown bounding theorem for r j (pÄ i , pÄ j , v j *) establishing bounds on D MK, i .
where s j * :=s j (P , v*, h) denotes the actual bloc expenditure share for country j and %(pÄ i , pÄ j , x j )#x j pÄ i Âx j pÄ j is the country-j Laspeyres PPP index.
THE MULTILATERAL-ALLEN CONSUMPTION-SHARE SYSTEM
A quantity counterpart to the cost-of-living index can be obtained by using r k as a deflator for household k's expenditure ratio between two different price-utility situations (p i , v i ) and (p j , v j ). More precisely, the implicit country-k (Konu s-type real) consumption index is defined as
The result of substituting for r k (p i , p j , v) using (2) and setting k :=i, v i :=v i * , v j :=v i and v equal to either v i or v i * is the country-i Allen [1, p. 199 ] consumption index at prices p :=p i or p :=p j :
The number q i (p, v i * , v i ) is a measure of household i 's consumption at its actual utility level v i * relative to that at some reference utility level v i evaluated using prices p.
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If v i is chosen so that c i (p, v i )=c j (p, v j *) for some j # N, then q i becomes a per-household consumption index for country i relative to country j:
A natural way to generalize this bilateral country-specific measure into a multilateral bloc-specific one is to use it as the basic building block of a system of consumption shares:
Thus the multilateral-Allen (MA) consumption share for country i is defined as the ratio of the minimum country-i expenditure required to attain representative-household utility level v i * at reference prices p to the minimum bloc expenditure required to attain representative-household utility levels v* at the same prices:
The number S MA, i (p, v*, h) is the fraction of total bloc expenditure that would be attributable to country-i households at reference prices p.
The data set P admits n possible choices for the reference-price vector p in (26). If the country-i price vector p i is chosen, S MA, i (p i , v*, h) is called the MA own-price consumption share for country i. In general,
is only a quasi-consumptionshare system since its components do not necessarily sum to unity.
The MA own-price expenditure-share deflator for country i is a blocspecific PPP index D MA, i defined implicitly by
The number D MA, i (P , v*, h) is the amount by which country i 's actual expenditure share must be deflated in order to make it equal to the same country's MA own-price consumption share. Since
Using the definitions of D MA, i , S MA, i and s i , D MA, i can be shown to be equal to the MK PPP index D MK, i :
Thus the MA own-price consumption-share system and the MK PPP index are completely consistent with one another. This fact together with (20) implies a corollary to Pollak's [17, p. 11] bounding theorem for r j (pÄ i , pÄ j , v j *) establishing bounds on S MA, i .
is the country-j Paasche consumption index.
By rearranging the terms of the definition of the MA own-price consumption shares multiplied and divided by their sum, the former can be reexpressed as the product of the latter and the harmonic mean of the associated national expenditure ratios, each deflated by the corresponding plutocratic PPP index:
Dividing both sides of (31) by S MA, k (pÄ k , v*, h) reveals that the normalized MA own-price consumption-share system is the system of consumption shares that is dual to the plutocratic PPP index:
Theorem 6. For any R satisfying P1 P4, the right-hand side of (33) with R PP :=R defines a system of consumption shares S(P , v*, h) := [S 1 (P , v*, h), ..., S n (P , v*, h)] # S n&1 that is continuous in (P , v*, h) and homogeneous of degree zero in each of pÄ 1 , ..., pÄ n&1 and pÄ n .
Corollary 1. The ratio of per-household consumption shares for countries i and j is equal to the per-household consumption index for country i relative to country j obtained by using R to deflate the per-household expenditure ratio between the two countries:
Thus, under P1 P4, any bloc-specific PPP index R and its quantity counterpart Q are dual to some system of consumption shares S and its PPP counterpart D , the ith element of which is defined as the amount by which the actual expenditure share s* i must be deflated in order to make it equal to S i . In particular, the plutocratic PPP index and its quantity counterpart Q PP defined by the right-hand side of (34) with R :=R PP are dual to the MA consumption-share system and the MK PPP index.
THE EXACT APPROACH
As with all economic approaches to index number theory, the exact approach is based on the assumption of utility-maximizing behaviour. Further, it is assumed that household preferences can be adequately approximated by a certain class of utility functions. In the present section, this assumption is used to develop a novel exact index-number argument that shows that the novel quantity approach of the preceding section justifies three particular systems of axiomatic quantity indexes.
In addition to satisfying R1, suppose that u k is independent of k and (positively) homothetic. Consequently, household preferences can be represented by a PLH utility function u and the associated expenditure function can be written as
is the unit expenditure function for u.
A bilateral axiomatic per-household (real) consumption index for country i relative to country j is a real-valued function , of the observed price and (per-household) quantity data for the two countries. Such an index is defined to be exact for a PLH utility function u if, for every (p i , x i ) and
Diewert [4, p. 181] noted that the price and quantity vectors in this equation are not completely independent variables since (
is assumed to be consistent with expenditure-minimizing behaviour. Given c k :=c for all k # N, the MA consumption share for country i is defined as
where +* :=(+ 1 * , ..., + n *) and + k * :=u(x k ). Dividing the numerator and denominator of the right-hand side of this expression by c(p, + k *) for some k # N and substituting for c(p, +* l ) using (36) with + :=u(x l ) for all l # N yields
Now, by (37),
Thus, given a bilateral axiomatic per-household consumption index that is exact for a PLH utility function representing the (homothetic) preferences of the (identical) representative households, the ith country-k star-system consumption share _ k * , i (P, X, h) is a direct approximation for the MA consumption index for country i. Substituting for c(p, +* l ) in (38) using (36) with + :=u(x l ) for all l # N, dividing the resulting numerator and denominator by u(x i ), and then invoking (37) yields
Dividing each side of this equation by the corresponding sum over the i s yields
Thus, given a bilateral axiomatic per-household consumption index that is exact for a PLH utility function representing the (homothetic) preferences of the (identical) representative households, the ith own-share of bloc consumption _ OS, i (P, X, h) 21 is a direct approximation for the plutocratic consumption index for country i.
By Theorem 6, the right-hand side of (33) with R PP :=R 0, 1 n Ân defines a system of consumption shares that is dual to the generalized mean-oforder-zero PPP index with equal weights:
Substituting for R 0, 1 n Ân using (3), (4) and (2), and rearranging terms,
Assuming identical homothetic preferences and then invoking (37) yields
Thus, given a bilateral axiomatic per-household consumption index that is exact for a PLH utility function representing the (homothetic) preferences of the (identical) representative households, the ith Elteto Ko ves Szulc (EKS) consumption share _ EKS, i (P, X, h) is a direct approximation for the generalized mean-of-order-zero consumption index for country i with equal weights. The significance of the preceding results is that they provide rigorous exact index-number interpretations for three different systems of axiomatic quantity indexes. Hence they represent the first justifications grounded in economic theory for the use of particular (practical) multilateral comparison methods. Interestingly, Diewert [8, Propositions 8, 13 and 14] asserted the superiority of the same three methods (in relation to five others) using his multilateral test approach.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The foregoing provides the first formal extension of the theory of the cost-of-living index into the realm of multilateral international comparisons. Such comparisons can be made from the viewpoint of an individual or from that of a group. Those that reflect the perspective of an individual who is seen to represent everyone in her country of residence are called``country specific.'' Those that reflect the perspective of a group that includes a representative from each country being compared are called`b loc specific'' in recognition of the fact that they depend on which countries are members of the bloc in question. The paper introduces this terminology with the object of re-emphasizing the practical importance of the associated conceptual distinctions.
Different classes of bloc-specific indexes can be distinguished by the types of comparisons they facilitate. The dual relationships among four of these two comprising indexes of relative purchasing power and two comprising indexes of real consumption were introduced above. Within this novel framework, (i) the plutocratic and multiplicative democratic PPP indexes were shown to belong to a particular``mean-of-order-*'' class of PPP indexes with good axiomatic properties, (ii) novel multilateral analogues to the Konu s PPP index and the Allen consumption index were each shown to have definite bounds and to be mutually consistent with the plutocratic PPP index, and (iii) the star, own-share and EKS systems of axiomatic quantity indexes were shown to be justifiable.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1. Since pÄ k :=# k p k , R is homogeneous of degree minus one in p k , and R and c i are each PLH in p i , 
